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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
Case No
k
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
13725
N. A.,
Defendant-Appellant,
et aL
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves a dispute regarding ownership of
certain cattle or proceeds thereof, the cattle having been
sold pending determination by the Court. Ownership is
claimed by involuntary defendant J. B. J. FEEDYARDS, INC., subject to a security interest in favor
of defendant-appellant FIRST SECURITY BANK OF
UTAH, N. A. Ownership is also claimed by intervenorappellant DON ALLEN, subject to a security interest
in favor of pkintiff-respondent ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK. A counterclaim of appellant for costs of
feeding the disputed animals is operative against respondent if respondent prevails.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Trial was held before The Honorable George E.
Ballif, District Judge, in the Fourth Judicial District,
Utah County. Judgment was granted in favor of intervenor-appellant, subject to the security interest of plaintiff-respondent, except for a counterclaim of defendantappellant FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N. A.
for the costs of feeding the subject animals prior to their
sale. Trial was held without a jury.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant FIRST SECURITY BANK OF
UTAH, N. A. seeks reversal of the judgment granting
title to the subject animals to intervenor and respondent. Although appellant desires confirmation of the
validity of its counterclaim for feed costs, if the judgment is reversed, the counterclaim becomes moot because
appellant is agreeable to absorbing the costs of feeding
the animals which this Court will then determine to be
under appellant's valid security interest. In such event,,
appellant also seeks an order compelling restoration to
appellant of funds representing certain proceeds of sale
which were received by respondent from the Clerk of
the Court. Intervenor-appellant seeks reversal of the
award on the counterclaim pursuant to a cross^appeal,
but desires affirmance of the Court's judgment otherwise.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Abundant reference to the facts as reflected in the
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record wil; .u . H -sai\, umi- .»I .MI.- statement and in
the argument, lite transcript of the trial will be referred
to by page number and, where appropriate, line number,
in the form "Tr. .... 1. ". The pleadings and 'other documents in the 'balance of the record will be referred to in
the Utvni. I.
Exhibits will be described according
te then respective sequential numbers, with an aittempt
to indicate t». the Court, where appropriate, Exhibits of
such material it \ a to deserve detailed review by the
Court.
Concerning identification of the parties, defendant
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N. A. will be
termed "appellant" or sometimes "FIRST SECURITY"
and plaintiff ZIONS FIRST NATIONAI BANK will be
termed "respondent" or sometimes "ZIONS". Intervenor
DON ALIJEN will be referred to as "mtervenar" notwithstanding that said intervenor is a respondent with
v^w't to FIRST SECURITY'S appeal and is in the
status of an appellant with regard to his own cross-apt- .*;
The so-called "involuntary defendants* win he desu>natedby name or the use of said rule where appropriate*
With the most frequent reference to involuntary defendant \ r ' FEEDYAKDS. INC., sometimes called
!
1.. J
. : convenience, The involuntary defendants
have no appeal or cross appeal pending
The rathei complex and iutuirump. amma to be reviewed,, by the Court began, to unfold, in approximately
April, 1972, when various members of the FORD family,
involuntary defendants, together wi1K U M 1 ! T * M
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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GARTH BOSWELL, commenced a business of purchasing and selling cattle through a corporation known as
J. B. J. FEEDYARDS, INC., of which BOSWELL
was 50% owner and a vice president and director (Tr.
300 1. 2). The principal business of J. B. J. was centered
in feed lots and corrals owned by J. B. J. in Goshen,
Utah. The business was to be financed partly by investment of the respective parties, but more substantially
through loans from the Payson, Utah Office of appellant
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N. A. The following obligations to appellant were incurred by J. B. J.
Principal
Amount

Reference

Promissory Note of
April 20,1972 $126,200.00

Exhibit 49

Promissory Note of
June 7, 1972 $ 39,000.00

Exhibit 50

Promissory Note of
July 12, 1972 $ 53,000.00

Exhibit 51

Description

Overdrafts in various
amounts
The initial advance of $126,200.00 was for the purpose of purchasing cattle to go on a feeding program
of J. B. J. (Tr. 706), the next advance of $39,000.00 was
for the purpose of paying for part of the ovefrcost of the
feeder program and to finance purchase of bulls and other
cattle (Tr. 707) and the advance of $53,000.00 financed
an increased number of bulls in the bull program (Tr.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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708), J. B. J. provided for the benefit of appellant a
security agreement covering all of the animals together
with substitutions, replacements, additions and proceeds
thereof (Exh. 53, Tr. 710). Financing statements covering the collateral were duly filed with the Utah Secretary of State between April 20 and April 27, 1972 (Exhs.
54, 55 and 56, Tr. 713-715). On April 12, 1973, after the
dispute herein described had become very ripe, an additional financing statement was filed for the purpose of
cxmfinning the security interest in the animals here in
dispute (Exh. 57, Tr. 717). The obligations of J. B. J.
to appellant were guaranteed by WILLIAM G. BOSWELL, JAMES K. FORD, WILLIAM FORD and JOSEPH FORD & SONS, a partnership (Exh. 52, Tr. 709).
Additional security documents and other agreements of
various kinds pertaining to the J. B. J. financing were
also taken, including a security agreement on crops (Exh.
58), a real estate mortgage (Exh. 59), various pledge,
collateral and subordination agreements (Exhs. 60
through 67) mid basic corporate authorization resolutions
(Exhs. 68 and 69). The overdraft obligations arose during the course of business in which cattle were in transit
either for purchase or for sale, requiring some "float"
in the cash flow of J. B. J.
MR. BOSWELL was primarily responsible for purchasing and selling the animals beginning in April, 1972.
No purchases for J. B. J. were made later than January
25,1973 (Tr. 300 1. 12). Many of the cattle, particularly
the bulls, were purchased from intervenor DON ALLEN,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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who was doing business in Montana and whose principal
Utah customer was J. B. J. (Tr. 496 1. 28). During the
period April, 1972 to January, 1973, J. B. J. purchased
approximately 3,175 head of cattle and sold or lost approximately 3,203.5 head which can be accounted for
(Exh. 74, Tr. 759). The latter figure includes the cattle
in dispute in this action, which were sold between February and September, 1973 pursuant to a much disputed
stipulation and agreement (Exh. 93) and have been meticulously accounted for (Exh. 11). Exhibits 11, 53, 74 and
93 are critical to this action and deserve careful review
by this Court.
Various problems arose in the conduct of the business of J. B. J. which gave FIRST SECURITY considerable apprehension, including a growing concern over the
frequent overdrafts and the lack of accounting information from J. B. J. (Tr. 733). Consequently, FIRST SECURITY'S principal representative in this matter, Mr.
Roy Broadbent, made demand on October 6, 1972 for
payment of the overdraft and liquidation of the bull program (Exh. 70, Tr. 736). Thereafter, Mr. Broadbent
made an inspection of the J. B. J. cattle on December
6, 1972 and determined that only 584 head were present,
when the total should have been approximately 819
(Tr. 733). Earlier inspections had indicated the correct
number of animals (Tr. 731). Most of the cattle belonging to J. B. J. and held for more than a few days had
been branded with the J. B. J. brand " ( - ) " (Tr. 837).
Also, most of J. B. J. purchases and sales had been
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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handled through checks or drafts drawn or payable
either at FIRST SECURITY or ZIONS, with proceeds
of sales represented by deposits to J, B. J.'s accounts
at one of those two banks (Exh. 74).
During the middle of December, 1972, some of the
checks or drafts of J. B. J. were being returned unpaid,
as a result of which MR. BOSWELL was seeking new
financing for J. B. J. Two shipments of cattle designated
for purchase by J. B. J., totaling 74 head and shipped in
two segments on December 15 and December 20, 1972,
were shipped by intervenor DON ALLEN in anticipation that the new financing could pay for them (Tr. 500
1. 4). When it appeared that payment would not be
made to intervenor, MR. BOSWELL branded those animals with a "V5", an unregistered brand, but kept the
animals in the feed lots maintained by J. B. J. at Goshen,
Utah (Tr. 382). These animals are among those in dispute.
On January 1, 1973, intervenor DON ALLEN, together with his wife, met with MR. BOSWELL and Mr.
Wallace Gardner at the Spanish Fork Office of ZIONS
FIRST NATIONAL BANK and formed a new cattle
trading company to be named MOUNT NEBO CATTLE
COMPANY (Tr. 472 1. 23). At the same time, a loan
in the amount of $50,000.00 was obtained from ZIONS
to help finance the MOUNT NEBO CATTLE business
(Tr. 476, 561). Thereafter, cattle purchases were made
in the name of MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY
and copies of invoices reflecting the same were received
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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at ZIONS beginning late January, 1973 (Tr. 573 1. 6).
MR. BOSWELL was employed as a commission agent
for MOUNT NEBO on January 1, 1973, confirmed in
writing on February 14, 1973 (Exh. 24, Tr. 333 1. 14).
Since MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY had no
Utah facilities of its own, MR. BOSWELL used the
same feed lots in Goshen, Utah as were used to feed and
corral animals belonging to J. B. J. MR. BOSWELL paid
for recording of the "V5" brand with the appropriate
state office and began using that brand on the MOUNT
NEBO animals (Tr. 369, 371).
By January 25, 1973, the FORDS and Mr. Broadbant of FIRST SECURITY had become increasingly
concerned about the security and identity of J. B. J.'s
animals in the Goshen yards. On that date, approximately 167 animals were taken from the J. B. J. yards
to a nearby property owned by the FORDS (Tr. 185).
After further discussion and investigation, the FORDS
and FIRST SECURITY believed that the remaining animals at the J. B. J. yards in Goshen were part of the
J. B. J. animals, subject to the FIRST SECURITY lien.
Thereafter, FIRST SECURITY instituted a lawsuit
against J. B. J. and the guarantors, Civil No. 38191,
Fourth Judicial District, Utah County, and on February 7, 1973 a Writ of Attachment was issued pursuant
to which an additional 267 head of animals were taken
by the sheriff from the Goshen yards of J. B. J. and
quartered temporarily at the Lazy S Cattle Ranch in
Elberba, Utah (Tr. 202, Exh. 23). During subsequent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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hearings on motions to quash the Writ, the intervener
DON ALLEN appeared and asserted a claim to the
animals. Counsel for the parties thereafter stipulated
that the cattle should be sold and fee proceeds held for
disposition by the Court (Exh. 93). The 267 head thus
attached, with adjustments for deaths, new births and
other claims are the animals here in dispute. The writ
of atitachment in the other action was dissolved alter
some of the attached animals were sold by MR. BOSWELL as agent for MR. ALLEN. Fallowing disputes
concerning affectiveness of the stipulation, FIRST SECURITY arranged the remaining sales and all proceeds
were accounted for (Exh. 11).
The lawsuit from which this appeal arises was commenced by ZIONS after the stipulation in the prior
action was entered into, the claim of ZIONS not having
been asserted previously. Motions to consolidate were
denied by the respective judges handling both cases and
this case proceeded to trial solely on the issue of title to
the animals and security interests applicable thereto and
FIRST SECURITY'S counterclaim for costs of feeding
the animals. No issues pertaining to damages from the attachment or otherwise were reserved or tried in the lower
court in this action, but remain in the other action for subsequent trial unless this Court renders most of such claims
moot.
On the morning of the 8th day following entry of
judgment herein and within an hour before the notice
of appeal and supersedeas bond were filed with the lower
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Court, counsel for initervenor obtained an order requiring
the Clerk of Court to turn over that portion of the proceeds of sale which had been deposited with the Clerk,
amounting to $34,127.18. Counsel for appellant agreed
not to contest such highly irregular procedure on the
gentlemen's understanding, not made part of the record,
that such funds would be paid to and applied by ZIONS
toward the note of intervenor and that ZIONS would
restore the funds for the benefit of appellant if this Court
should reverse the existing judgment.
ARGUMENT
I. THE OWNERSHIP OF J. B. J. FEED YARDS,
INC. EXTENDED TO, AND THE SECURITY
INTEREST OF FIRST SECURITY BANK
ATTACHED TO AND WAS PERFECTED IN
THE ANIMALS IN DISPUTE AS CATTLE
ORIGINALLY HELD BY J. B. J. OR SUBSTITUTIONS, REPLACEMENTS, ADDITIONS
OR PROCEEDS THEREOF.
(A) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CERTAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS PERTAINING TO TITLE AND
SECURITY INTERESTS.
Appellant believes it helpful to the Court to designate those portions of the Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment which appellant deems materially erroneous.
Arguments in support of appellant's position are conDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tained under the subsequent sub-headings. Appellant
expressly submits that the following were erroneous:
Findings of Fact (R. 450):
1. The finding that the security agreements of appellant were a "purchase money mortgage for purchasing
approximately 600 head of feeder cattle," as contrasted
to the language of the security agreements said the business practices of the parties which provide broader security interests, covering more than just the feeder cattle;
2. The last statement regarding the "bull program"
as a rapid turnover program necessitating a 30 day sale,
which is substantially correct, but does not take cognizance of many exceptions in which bulls were retained
for a longer period;
*

*

*

6. The findings that the practice by which intervenor sold animals to J. B. J. was on a "C. O. D." basis,
and that intervenor ALLEN "expressly retained title
to said cattle until he was paid for them by J. B. J.
FEEDYARDS, INC.";
7. The misleading statement which suggests that
the inability of J. B. J. FEEDYARDS, INC. to pay
intervenor in November and December, 1972 was solely
the result of termination of the financing arrangements
with FIRST SECURITY BANK, and the characterization of any shipment as "C. 0. D.";
8. The critical findings that the December 15 and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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December 20, 1972 loads were "rejected" by J. B. J.,
that intervenor ALLEN directed MR. BOSWELL to
brand the animals "V5" or to hold the loads for intervenor, and that BOSWELL received said two loads of
animals for intervenor ALLEN and not for J. B. J.;
*

*

#

11. The suggestion that intervenor ALLEN did not
ship cattle in January, 1973 for the account of J. B. J.
FEEDYARDS, INC. as distinguished from MOUNT
NEBO CATTLE COMPANY, and that the loads of
December 15 and December 20, 1972 were part of the
MOUNT NEBO cattle;
12. The finding which incorrectly characterizes the
financing statement of ZIONS and what it shows regarding MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY and DON
ALLEN and his wife (Compare Exh. 1) ;
13. The declaration that J. B. J. FEEDYARDS,
INC. did not "give value" for the cattle, and that only
the animals branded " ( - ) " belong to J. B. J. FEEDYARDS, INC.;
•

*

*

20. The finding that the animals described therein
were recognized by intervenor as animals "belonging to
him/' and the implications of ownership by such purported recognition.
Conclusions (R. 46f)
1. The conclusion that intervenor established his
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ownership of the animals set forth in Findings 15, 16,
18, 19, 20, 21 and 22, thus rendering erroneous the further conclusion as to intervener's right to deposited
monies;
*
2. The conclusion that defendant FIRST SECURITY BANK failed to establish any interest in the animals
or proceeds designated in Findings 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21
and 22;
3. The conclusion that intervenor had rights in the
animals set forth in Conclusion No. 1, and that plaintiff
ZIONS BANK had a security interest therein.
*

*

*

Judgment (JR. 470)
Without enumerating again the various paragraph
numbers, the Court will understand that appellant believes
the judgment to be incorrect on the same grounds and
for the same reasons as designated above in references to
the Findings and Conclusions.
(B) APPLICABLE LAW EXTENDS APPELLANT'S SECURITY INTERESTS
BOTH TO EXISTING AND AFTERACQUIRED PROPERTY AS COLLATERAL FOR BOTH PRESENT AND FUTURE ADVANCES.
The law applicable is derived primarily from the
Secured Transactions portion of the Uniform Commercial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Code, found in Chapter 9 of Title 70A. (Unless otherwise expressly shown, all statutory refecrenoes herein
shall be to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended).
Several features of commercial law representing forwardlooking legal concepts made certain by the Uniform Commercial Code include the attachment of a security interest (lien) to after-acquired property and the validity
of a security interest as collateral for future advances.
In addition, certain rules pertaining to passage of title
were also made more definite, as argued hereinafter.
Those critical legal concepts, as applied to the facts in
the record, compel new findings and conclusions in favor
of appellant.
The basic security document relied on by appellant
is the Security Agreement (Farm Products Chattel Mortgage) shown as Exhibit 53. That Security Agreement
was signed by all involuntary defendants, including the
corporate signature of J. B. J. FEED YARDS, INC. The
agreement covered various crops, feed and real property
in addition to cattle. The relevant portions pertaining
to cattle are:
" . . . (Debtor) grants to F I R S T S E C U R I T Y BANK OF UTAH, NATIONAL
A S S O C I A T I O N , Payson, Utah ("Bank")
a security interest in the following described
collateral and products and proceeds thereof:

1

(a) L I V E S T O C K A N D O T H E R
C H A T T L E S ; (Also describe the general location thereof) This is a purchase money mort-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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gage for purchasing approximately 600 head
of feeder cattle and five months of summer
grazing on the ground of King Creek Grazing
Association, Bancroft, Idaho, plus feeds, suppliments (sic), etc. Specific description will
be reported by photo copies attached to this
mortgage of purchase drafts, sales slips, or
other purchase evidence, but the cattle will be
mainly described in the following three groups:
1. 200 head of Holstein feeder steers, approximately 600 lbs. when bought.
2. 200 head of choice quality Hereford
Angus and mixed beef heifers, about 600 lbs.
when bought.
3. 200 head of choice quality Hereford
Angus and mixed beef steers, about 600 lbs.
when bought.
Together with any additions, replacements, or
substitutions during the life of this mortgage"
*

*

*

"The distinguishing brands or marks on any
livestock described are:
[(-)

on right side]

"The security interest shall extend to all
generations of increase of the above described
collateral and all additions and accessions
thereto, together with all additional property
of similar nature or any interest therein now
owned or hereafter acquired by Debtor, whether or not enumerated and whether branded or
unbranded with the marks indicated and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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whether or not said brands or marks are in the
position or location shown above."
*

*

*

"2. O B L I G A T I O N S
SECURED:
The security interest herein granted is given to
secure the payment and performance of the
following described obligations:
Principal
Date of
Amount
Notes
Terms of Payment
$126,200.00
4/20/72
Payable on or before ten months
from date.
(b) O T H E R O B L I G A T I O N S : To
secure payment of all principal and interest
of such other advances as Bank, in its sole
discretion, may make to Debtor up to an aggregate outstanding balance at any one time of
$
, or if no sum is designated a
maximum of THREE
TIMES the original
advance by Bank in connection with this agreement; provided, however, that the making of
any further loans, advances or expenditures
shall be optional with Bank, and nothing herein shall be construed to obligate Bank for any
such purposes; to secure payment of all other
obligations of Debtor to Bank or assignee of
Bank howerer evidenced, created or arising,
whether absolute or contingent, whether contracted directly or indirectly, and whether or
not due; and all modifications or renewals of
any obligations secured hereby." (emphasis
supplied)
Appellant must here observe that the basic legal
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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effect of the security agreement is not here in issue. The
question for this Court to determine from the evidence
is whether or not the concept of extending a security
interest to additions, replacements or substitutions of
the designated cattle carries the security interest of
FIRST SECURITY to the M head of cattle here at
issue. The basic proposition is: if the cattle in dispute
can be shown to represent cattle belonging to J. B. J.,
whenever purchased subsequent to April 20, 1972, then
the security interest of FIRST SECURITY under Exhibit 51 automatically and as a matter of law extends to
all such cattle. A further basic proposition is that all
such cattle secure not only the original promissory note
of $126,200.00, but also any additional advances made
by the BANK to or for the benefit of J. B. J., and that
such other obligations secured include the two additional
promissory notes and the overdraft designated in the
Statement of Facts above.
Appellant must further observe preliminarily that the
issues here do not involve conflicting security interests
in the same collateral determined from priorities of filing
or otherwise under §70A-9-312. If J. B. J. and FIRST
SECURITY can sustain their claim to the cattle in issue
by reason of the additions, replacements, substitutions
and proceeds concept, then the cattle do not belong to
intervener and are not subject to any security interest
held by ZIONS. Conversely, if the lower court were correct in its determinations, then FIRST SECURITY would
have no interest in the cattle at issue. The contest, thereDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fore, is not based on whether FIRST SECURITY or
ZIONS effected a financing statement filing first, but
rather which bank has any claim at all in the subject animals. The same debtor has not granted security interests
in the same collateral to more than one secured party.
Rather, the Court determines which debtor owned the
cattle and therefore which bank had a security interest
therein.
The evidence is uncontroverted that FIRST SECURITY advanced to or for the benefit of J. B. J. sums totaling $218,200.00 on three promissory notes (Exhs. 49, 50
and 51), together with overdrafts in varying amounts and
standing at $14,688.44 just prior to the payments of the
overdrafts. The promissory notes had on January 21,1974,
the first date of trial, an aggregate balance of principal
and accrued interest of $116,700.53 (Tr. 877-879). Those
advances constituted new value secured by cattle then
existing or thereafter acquired. Additional purchases were
made by J. B. J. in the ordinary course of business and
all of the cattle purchased thus came under the "floating
lien" held by FIRST SECURITY attaching to all cattle
held or subsequently acquired by J. B. J.
The rather steady stream of purchases and sales by
or for the account of J. B. J. is graphically illustrated in
Exhibit 74. Based on the regular books of account together
with other documents supporting that exhibit, it is evident
that J. B. J. purchased a total of 3,175 head for a total of
$1,234,319.75. Those facts render operable the provisions
of §70A-9-108:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
"Where a secured party makes an edvance, incurs an obligation, releases a perfected
security interest, or otherwise gives new value
which is to be secured in whole or in part by
after-acquired property his security interest
in the after-acquired collateral shall be deemed
to be taken for new value and not as security
for an antecedent debt if the debtor acquires
his rights in such collateral either in the ordinary course of his business or under a contract
of purchase made pursuant to the security
agreement within a reasonable time after new
value is given."
The security interest of FIRST SECURITY attached
to the cattle and became immediately perfected because
(1) the BANK had given value (cash advances from the
promissory notes and overdrafts; (2) a security agreement
existed indicating that the security interest would attach
to subsequently acquired cattle; and (3) J. B. J., as debtor,
obtained rights to the collateral as soon at the various
loads of cattle were loaded at the seller's place of shipment
and designated for J. B. J., or at the very least, when the
cattle were received at the feed lot of J. B. J. in Goshen,
Utah.
The agreement between FIRST SECURITY and
J. B. J. contemplating expressly that after-acquired cattle
would be covered also declared that such cattle would
secure future advances whether or not such advances were
made pursuant to a commitment. The operation of §70A9-204 is clearly effective in this case:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"(1) A security interest cannot attach
until there is agreement . . . that it attach and
value is given and the debtor has rights in the
collateral. I t attaches as soon as all of the
events in the preceding sentence have taken
place unless explicit agreement postpones the
time of attaching."
*

*

*

"(3) Except as provided in subsection
(4) a security agreement may provide that
collateral, whenever acquired, shall secure all
obligations covered by the security agreement."
*
s

*

*

"(5) Obligations covered by a security
agreement may include future advances or
other value whether or not the advances or
value are given pursuant to commitment."

Because the cattle or products thereof (including
newborn) were held by J. B. J. as a debtor engaged in
raising, fattening, grazing or other farming operations, the
cattle are deemed "farm products" under the provisions
of §7QA-9-109:
"(3) 'farm products' if they are crops
or livestock or supplies used or produced in
farming operations or if they are products of
crops or livestock in their unmanufactured
states (such as ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple
syrup, milk and eggs), and if they are in the
possession of a debtor engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or other farming operations.
If goods are farm products, they are neither
equipment nor inventory;"
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Appellant here submits that it met by convincing
and preponderant evidence its burden of proof in tracing
animals of J. B. J. through their various purchases and
sales, including the animals in dispute, which are sumsmarizde as item 6 on the sales column of Exhibit 74. The specific sales thereof are further detailed in Exhibit 11. Those
exhibits convincingly demonstrate the operation of the
substitutions, replacements, additions and proceeds concept. The concept is further supported by the fundamental
rule under the Uniform Commercial Code that the security
interest "attached", meaning that all J. B. J.'s interests
in the continuing stream of cattle purchases became subject to the lien of FIRST SECURITY, and contemporaneously, the lien or security interest became "perfected"
by reason of the prior filing of the financing statement
with the Secretary of State, rendering the security interest
invulnerable to any other creditors or purchasers of J. B. J.
§70A-9-303(l) declares:
"A security interest is perfected when it
has attached and when all of the applicable
steps required for perfection have been taken.
* * * If such steps are taken before the security
interest attaches, it is perfected at the time
when it attaches."
The animals falling within the terms "substitutions,"
"replacements" or "additions" fall under the security agreement irrespective of whether any of the animals are actually sold. The evidence here amply demonstrates that the
animals of J. B. J. were sold in the ordinary course of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
business up through February 8, 1973 and were thereafter sold in order to obtain the money to be held pending
determination of ownership by the Court. The actual sale
of animals, as distinguished from purchases or products
(newborn) brings into operation the additional concept
of "proceeds". When J. B. J. cattle were sold, the money
received in payment thereof, or any accounts receivable
arising for future payment, or any cattle purchased with
the money derived from sales, would constitute "cash"
or "noncash" proceeds in which appellant's security interest would continue on a perfected basis. The legal effect
occurs both by reason of the security agreement provisions
cited above as well as the following operative provisions
of §70A-9-306:
"(1) 'Proceeds' includes whatever is received when collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of.
The term also includes the account arising when
the right to payment is earned under a contract
right. Money, checks and the like are 'cash
proceeds.' All other proceeds are 'noncash
proceeds.'
"(2) Except where this chapter otherwise provides, a security interest continues in
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or
other disposition thereof by the debtor unless
his action was authorized by the secured party
in a security agreement or otherwise, and also
continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor.
"(3)

The security interest in proceeds

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
is a continuously perfected security interest
if the interest in the original collateral was perfected but it ceases to be a perfected security
interest and becomes unperfected ten days
after receipt of the proceeds by the debtor unless
(a) a filed financial statement covering
the original collateral also covers proceeds;
The "proceeds" concept harmonizes well with the
previously expressed notions pertaining to afternacquired
property through substitutions, replacements and additions. The right to follow the proceeds is further confirmed
by §70A-9-307(l) Which denies a purchaser any bona fide
purchaser position and makes him subject to the lien:
A buyer in ordinary course of business
(subsection (9) of § 70A-1-201) other than
a person buying farm products from a person
engaged in farming operations takes free of a
security interest created by his seller even
though the security interest is perfected and
even though the buyer knows of its existence."
It is further observed that the Uniform Commercial
Oode is specifically designed to permit the "floating lien"
on inventory such as the cattle inventory demonstrated in
this case, and that the security interest is not lost, either
by the abundant purchase and sale toansactions or by the
intermingling or commingling of cash or non-cash proceeds
arising from sales. §7GA-9-205 states in pertinent part:
"A security interest is not invalid or
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fraudulent against creditors by reason of
liberty in the debtor to use, commingle or dispose of all or part of the collateral (including
returned or repossessed goods) or to collect or
compromise accounts, contracts rights or chattel paper, or to accept the return of goods or
make repossessions, or to use, commingle or
dispose of proceeds or by reason of the failure
of the secured party to require the debtor to
account for proceeds or replace collateral. * * *
The right of the bank to follow through the "proceeds"
of cattle on which it has a security interest is demonstrated
in Baker Production Credit Assn. v. Lang Creek Meat Co.,
Inc., et al., and First State Bank of Oregon (Sept. 1973
Ore. Sup. Ct.) 513 P.2d 1129. The Court upheld the claim
of the cattle feeder's finanoer (in the position of FIRST
SECURITY here) for proceeds as against the financer of
the slaughter house, stating with reference to the equivalent of 70A-9-306 and 70A-9-307 (1):
The code, as to farm products, allows the
security interest to follow the collateral
through a succession of purchases. See Garden
City Production Credit Assn. v. Lannan, 186
Neb. 688, 186 NW2d 99 (1971). (t*r*, € t H3%>
In Burlington Nat'l Bank v. Strauss, 50 Wis.2d 270,
184 NW2d 122 (1971), the Court expressly declared that
the financing bank did not waive its security interest in
cattle by allowing its borrower to sell, commingle and otherwise dispose of cattle. Moreover, the Court uptheld the
rights of the bank to cattle obtained through an afterDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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acquired property clause under its prior perfected security
inteorest, as against the claims of the seller, Strauss, who
had not filed:
We think Strauss did not perfect his security interest by filing the collateral sales notes
and is not entitled to the priority protection of
§ 409.312 (4), Stats., against the after-acquired
clause of the bank's security instrument. To
perfect a purchase money security interest,
§ 409.302(1), Stats., requires the filing of a
financing statement. (184 NW2d, 125, 126)
This Court has previously determined that the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (Title 70A),
Chapter 9, Secured Transactions, prevail over the livestock Brand and Anti-Theft Act, § 4-13-1, et seq., in establishing the procedures for perfecting a security interest
in livestock. Thus, a perfected security interest of a bank
which financed the cattle purchase prevailed over the asserted rights under the branding statutes of a conditional
vendor. Wilson, et al. v. Burrows, et aL, 27 Ut.2d 436, 497
P.2d 240 (1972). That case is also helpful in that it effectively overrules Pugh v. Stratton, 22 Ut.2d 190, 450 P.2d
463 (1969), which had relied on a misinterpretation of
when the title passes to the buyer as the basis for reaching
a contrary result. It was made clear in the Wilson case that
if the purchaser obtained rights in the collateral through
a contract and possession, and the purchaser's bank has
a prior perfected security interest, title passes and the lien
attaches to cut off the rights of the vendor. That is preDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cisely the case at bar, for intervenor's rights in the cattle
were terminated when the shipments were segregated for
and shipped to J. B. J. pursuant to agreement. The problems of the Wilson case obtained a further legal dimension,
for in a subsequent appeal involving most of the same
parties and a related transaction, the Court expressly determined that since the cattle vendors did not file a financing statement or otherwise perfect a security interest, the
vendors lost all rights to the cattle, title passed to the purchaser and the purchaser's bank had an enforceable security interest. Walker Bank v. Burrows, et al., 29 Ut.2d 218,
507 P.2d 384 (1973). Questions of passage of title are discussed more fully under the next sub-heading.
In summary of the foregoing arguments, we urge the
Court's consideration of the following:
(a) The cattle here at issue, not being thoroughbreds requiring genealogical records, cannot be traced individually, but must be considered in groups delineated
by the various shipments of purchases and sales of which
J. B. J. and DON ALLEN had record.
(b) The most definitive evidence before the Court
is summarized in Exhibit 74 and explained by the testimony of RoyBroadbent (Tr. 759-831) and the supporting
exhibits (Exh. 75-84). The recapitulation of Exhibit 74
draws together all of the documentary records of J. B. J.
and DON ALLEN together with certain testimony and
demonstrates the results of the entire history of J. B. J.'s
business. The animals in dispute are included within that
tracing of animals to J. B. J. and the security interest of
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FIRST SECURITY. A slight discrepancy of 28.5 head
appears in balancing purchases against sales, not a surprising figure (less than 1% error) in view of the imperfect
records of J. B. J. and DON ALLEN and the total volume
of around 3,200 head.
(c) As to most of the animals, no legal issue of passage of title exists, thus enhancing the credibility of exhibit 74
(d) With minor possible and arguable exceptions,
no evidence whatever appears in the record which would
trace the animals described in Exhibit 74, including the
267 head in dispute, to any ownership of intervener or to
any security interest of ZIONS.
(C)

TITLE TO CATTLE DELIVERED TO
THE PROPERTIES OF J. B. J. FEEDYARDS, INC. PASSED TO J. B. J. AND
BECAME IMMEDIATELY SUBJECT
TO THE LIEN OF APPELLANT.

The question of passage of title is critical for this Court
to determine. Intervener in this proceeding attempts to
claim cattle which were delivered to J. B. J., accepted by
J. B. J., put in the feed lots by J. B. J., intermingled with
other cattle of J. B. J. J. B. J. and FIRST SECURITY
assert that the facts evidence a complete passage of title
to J. B. J. and attachment of the FIRST SECURITY
lien. The Court here deals with the legal questions by
which the secured transactions chapter of the Uniform
Commercial Code, where the metaphysical concept of
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"title" is immaterial, must be superimposed on the sales
chapter, where title does become important. Hence, FIRST
SECURITY could have had a security interest in carbtle
of J. B. J. irrespective of whether J. B. J. had clear "title"
or some other kind of interest in the collateral so far as the
secured transactions chapter is concerned. Fortunately,
however, the evidence in the record amply demonstrates
the fact that title in the cattle did exist in J. B. J. and the
attachment of the security interest of appellant becomes
more clearly effective for that reason. In construing the
effect of title, the Court must rely on provisions of §70A2-401, quoted in relevant part as follows:
"(1) Title to goods cannot pass under
a contract for sale prior to their identification
to the contract § 70A-2-501), and unless otherwise explicitly agreed the buyer acquires by
their identification a special property as limited
by this act. Any retention or reservation by
the seller of the title (property) in goods
shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in
effect to a reservation of a security interest.
Subject to these provisions and to the provisions of the chapter on Secured Transactions
(chapter 9), title to goods passes from the
seller to the buyer in any manner and on any
conditions explicitly agreed on by the parties.
(2) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed
title passes to the buyer at the time and place
at which the seller completes his performance
with reference to the physical delivery of the
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goods, despite any reservation of a security interest and even though a document of title is
• ••

The Wilson and Walker Bank cases, supra, are consistent with the statutory provisions governing passage
of title and are supportive of appellant's factual and legal
arguments. Those cases represent this Court's most
definitive pronouncements on the subject. A very persuasive case from another state in point here is North Platte
State Bank v. Production Credit Association of North
Platte, 189 Neb. 44, 200 NW2d 1 (1972). The Court sustained the validity of a security interest of the PCA, with
future advances and after-acquired property, as against
a bank which had advanced money to the same farmer
(Tucker) for purchase of specific animals on which it attempted to take a security interest. Tucker had received
the animals from the seller some 45 days earlier, had not
paid the seller, but title had passed to Tucker nevertheless
and the cattle had immediately come under the security
interest of PCA. The following excerpts are relevant to
the factual and legal considerations at bar:
Whatever the parties may have thought,
the provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code govern, and it is clear that title to the
cows actually passed to Tucker when they
reached his ranch and he received the actual
physical possession of them.
(Supra at p. 5).
*

*

*

Another bank with a prior perfected security interest
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prevailed over a seller because of passage of title to the
bank's customer (buyer) and immediate attachment of
the security interest, with resulting loss of any legitimate
claim of the buyer, in First National Bank of Elkhart
County v. Smoker (Ind. C C A . 1972) 286 NE2d 203.
Smoker was in essentially the same position as intervenor
DON ALLEN here and the bank was equivalent to FIRST
SEOURITY. In reversing a trial court decision in favor
of Smoker, the Court engaged in a detailed discussion of
the rationale underlying the Uniform Commercial Code
provisions quoted above and then concluded:
Pursuant to the above cited provisions,
we hold, as a matter of law, that Smoker retained only a purchase money security interest
in the eighty-five head of cattle upon the delivery of such cattle to Whisler under an oral
contract for sale. To have effectively reserved
his rights, Smoker would have had to proceed
under Article 9, § 19-9-101 et seq., concerning
secured transactions, specifically I.C. 1971,
26-1-9-312(3); Ind. Ann.St. § 19-9-312(3).
Since Smoker failed to perfect his security interest in the inventory of Whisler, his rights
in the enghty-five head of cattle or the proceeds
thereof are subordinated to the rights of the
Bank, which had a prior perfected security interest, § 19-9-312(5), and this is true regardless of whether Smoker, by explicit agreement,
retained title to the goods. In Herington Livestock Auction Company v. Verschoor, Iowa,
179 NW2d 491, 495 (1970), it was stated:
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"Thus for any purposes controlled by explicit agreement between the parties or by
provisions of the Act which make passage of
title a material factor, intent of the parties
is relevant. But for purposes of determination
of when an interest becomes a security interest,
the prior methaphysical concept of title has
been abandoned and analysis of the steps taken
by the parties is substituted." (emphasis supplied) lj i^pr-V & t %{0
The facts here at issue couldn't have been better
tailored to fit within the concepts of the above cases.
Having in mind the principles of law thus established, we
turn to the specific factual points which this court must
review. The passage of title question has focused in the
evidence most expressly around those animals contained
in the loads dated December 15, 1972 (40 head) and December 20, 1972 (34 head). The legal principles apply,
however, to support the claims of J. B. J. and FIRST
SECURITY to substantially all of the animals listed in
the purchases column of Exhibit 74, Items 5 through 15.
No substantial disagreement exists with regard to the purchases listed in Items 1 through 4. The method of operation
which applies to all of the questioned purchases can be
most easily seen with reference to the December 15 and
December 20 loads and discussion will continue with those
reference points. The Court will find instructive the summary of J. B. J. FEEDYARDS, INC. cattle purchases
shown as Exhibit 33. This document was prepared by
MR. BOSWELL, beginning around January, 1973 and
continuing for several months (Tr. 424 1. 28). It is exDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tremely significant that Exhibit 33 contains the December
15 and December 20 loads in issue as the final shipments
on MR. BQSWELL's list. On that exhibit, he noted that
the prior two shipments of November 29 (32 head) and
December 12 (33 head) had not been paid for because the
checks bounced. Although those two loads are not expressly
in issue as to title, appellant believes them significant for
the reason that an account receivable was created between
DON ALLEN and J. B. J. by reason of failure to pay for
the November 29 and December 12 loads, placing those
loads in exactly the same position as the next two loads
of December 15 and December 20. The fact that such
animals were not paid for is not relevant with regard to
passage of title, for an obligation to pay arising through
practice of the parties and actual shipment of animals invoiced to J. B. J. gives rise to the obligation to pay, but
does not deprive the purchaser, J. B. J., of the right to
dominion over the animals. Although approximately one
year after preparing Exhibit 33 MR. BOSWELL claimed
that the loads dated December 15 and December 20 were
not accepted by J. B. J. (Tr. 425 1. 2), the Court can rely
more fully on the initial declaration of MR. BOSWELL in
preparation of Exh. 33 that those two loads were part of
the J. B. J. purchases.
The December 15 load is further supported by the
market clearances and inspection certificates from Montana contained in Exhibit 39, the five pages of which total
the 40 head usually described as the December 15 shipment. Those documents clearly show "J. B. J. FEEDLOT" in Goshen, Utah as the purchaser. A similar demonDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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stration is seen from Exhibit 40, which pertains to the 34
head contained in the so-called December 20 shipment.
The livestock market clearances and inspection certificates together with the trucking invoice shown as part
of that exhibit evidence "J. B. J. FEEDLOT" or J. B. J.
FEEDERS" as purchaser in Goshen, Utah. Intervener
ALLEN consistently described the market clearance certificates as "Mis of sale" (Tr. 556 1. 20 and 557 1. 20) and
indicated according to the practice in Montana that these
documents were used as evidence of ownership for the
cattle (Tr. 530 1. 30). The presumption naturally arises
that a sale had taken place from DON ALLEN to J. B. J.
MR. ALLEN also indicated that he was familiar with Exhibit 33 and that such schedule represented all of the
cattle purchases of J. B. J. through December 20, 1972
(Tr. 504 and 505). Up through December 20, he had sold
four loads to J. B. J. for which he was unpaid, but the
shipments had been billed to J. B. J. (Tr. 506 11. 8 and
15).
As the story concerning those two infamous loads is
further pieced together, it appears that MR. BOSWELL
flew to Montana on December 12 and 13, prior to the shipment of the December 15 and December 20 loads (Tr. 459
1. 11). In the meantime, MR. ALLEN was preparing the
December 15 load for shipment to J. B. J. (Tr. 468 1.15).
MR. BOSWELL indicated during discussions while in
Montana that J. B. J. would be unable to pay for the
cattle. Accordingly, MR. ALLEN told MR. BOSWELL to
mark the cattle or in some way keep them separate from
his cattle and that he would come down later and do
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somerthing with the livestock, Tr. 469 1. 23). The December 20 load was purchased in Montana, not by MR. ALLEN personally, but by order buyers who were employed
by him for the purpose of rounding up cattle in the various
cattle markets in Montana, Tr. 471 1. 21). These order
buyers were working for MR. ALLEN in connection with
purchase of cattle expressly for shipment to J. B. J., on
the basis of one to two loads per week (Tr. 499 1.1). During the discussions between MR. BOSWELL and MR.
ALLEN while MR. BOSWELL was in Montana, MR.
ALLEN indicated he had another load of cattle for J. B. J.
and shipped in anticipation that J. B. J. could handle
them with new financing, which MR. BOSWELL was trying to obtain from Producers Livestock in Salt Lake (Tr.
499 1. 25 through 500 1. 14). Those cattle were shipped
with the expectation that they would be purchased by
J . B . J . (Tr.500 1.18).
After the two loads arrived in Goshen, Utah within
a day or two following the December 15 and December
20 shipments dates, respectively, MR. BOSWELL caused
the "V5" brand to be placed on those 74 animals (Tr. 383
1.4). Although the loads were shipped prior to the decision
that J. B. J. could not pay for them, MR. BOSWELL
thereafter attempted to say that the two loads were
"turned down" or "rejected" (Tr. 384 1. 5 and 443 1. 19).
Appellant strongly submits that the testimony of MR.
BOSWELL and his actions cannot properly be construed
by the Court as giving any rise to an inference of retention
of title in those 74 animals by intervener ALLEN. At the
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time of the subject transections, MR. BOSWELL was a
vice president and a director of J. B. J. and never did
cease being an agent for J. B. J. (Tr. 460 1. 4). The
"V5" brand was an "open" brand, not designated for the
use of anyone, but having years earlier been used by MR.
BOSWELL's family, the Okelberry family (Tr. 382 1. 10
and 383 1. 26). MR. ALLEN knew nothing about the "V5"
brand and did not expressly request use of that brand
until the meeting on January 1, 1973 when MOUNT
NEBO CATTLE COMPANY was organized (Tr. 472 1.23
and 475 1. 8 and 508 1. 24). As of January 1, MOUNT
NEBO CATTLE COMPANY did not own a brand (Tr.
474 1. 27). At the time the December 15 and December
20 shipments were made, MR. ALLEN was lead to believe by MR. BOSWELL that BOSWELL was buying
out his partners in J. B. J. (Tr. 523 1. 4), knew that
FIRST SECURITY bad a lien on the cattle (Tr. 524 1.
14), but his willingness to send those shipments down
were partly in reliance on the refinancing at Producer's
Livestock with MR. BOSWELL in control of J. B. J. (Tr.
5491.20).
Without belaboring those shipments any further, we
believe the facts above recited expressly place the December 15 and December 20 shipments under the provisions
of § 70A-2-401 quoted earlier. The express segregation by
intervener ALLEN or his agents of the animals at the
point of shipment for the purpose of selling to J. B. J.,
with bills of sale to J. B. J., together with actual shipment
and receipt of animals in the J. B. J. yards at Goshen,
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Utah, all combine to declare unequivocally that the title
passed to J. B. J.
Moving briefly to other sales made by DON ALLEN
to J. B. J. which were questioned at trial by plaintiff and
intervenor ,the Court can refer easily to the documents
summarized on Exhibit 74, beginning with Item 5 in the
purchases column. Without repeating all of the information contained on the exhibit, appellant emphasizes that
each of the entries was supported by further documentary
evidence which is reliable. Items 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the purchases column are supported by Exhibits 75 through 78.
The 29 bead shown as Item 9 on September 20, 1972 is
supported by Exhibit 79. The 32 and 33 head, respectively shown as Items 10 and 11 on the purchases column of
Exhibit 74 are the loads which were included on MR.
BOSWELL's summary of J. B. J. purchases, Exhibit 33,
and indicated as not paid for. These items are further
supported by Exhibits 80 and 81, respectively. The December 14 purchase of five head shown as Item 12 in the
purchases column is further supported by a deposit slip
made part of Exhibit 80. We have already discussed Items
13 and 14 of purchases on Exhibit 74, the December 15
and December 20 loads. The supporting documents, Exhibits 75 through 82, are records which were taken either
from J. B. J. or from intervenor ALLEN and which form
sound basis for including those items as J. B. J. purchases.
Invoices, market clearances and deposit slips which clearly indicate the sale of animals can be relied upon. The
supplemental records consisting of the invoices, desposit
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slips and market clearances above referred to were not recorded in the bank accounts of J. B. J., but nevertheless
come from appropriate and ordinary business records. Admittedly, some effort was made by witness GILBERT,
called by opposing parties, to show certain duplications
in the purchases column of Exhibit 74. Appelant here
submits that the dates, weights, number of animals and
other particulars on documents referred to by MR. GILBERT were sufficiently different to raise the presumption that his documents reflected other transactions. He
consistenly admitted that the records of J. B. J. were incomplete, that he had to get a lot of information orally
from MR. BOSWELL, and that transactions existed pertaining to the business of J. B. J. which were not reflected
in the bank accounts (Tr. 963 1. 27, 964 1. 25, 966 1. 29
972 1. 22, 998 1. 29 and 1003 1. 12).
D. THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT INTERVENOR ALLEN EXPRESSLY RESERVED A SECURITY
INTEREST IN CATTLE SOLD.
Two of the more glaring errors in the Findings of
Fact are the statements in Finding No. 6 that cattle were
shipped on a C.O.D. basis and that MR. ALLEN expressly retained title to the cattle. Such findings are wholly
contrary to all of the reliable evidence. The record contains not one shred of evidence that any of the shipments
from intervener ALLEN to J. B. J. required cash on delivery at the time the shipments were received in Goshen,
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Utah or elsewhere. There is some testimony of the
'fC.O.D. basis", but the simple statement is not supported
by other evidence and is wholly comtrary to the remaining
evidence. As rather pointed examples, the two loads
shipped November 29 and December 12,1972, not disputed
as J. B. J. animals, were not paid for, according to MR.
BOSWELL (Tr. 427 1. 19). The whole pattern of dealing
as explained generally by all of the witnesses consisted
of J. B. J.'s ordering and receiving loads of cattle from
DON ALLEN and others, sometimes pursuant to specific
order and sometimes on a regular basis pursuant to practice. Upon receipt of the invoices, payment was made by
check or draft.
Two alternative methods appear in the Uniform Commercial Code for reservation of a security interest by a
seller. Under § 70A-9-2G3, a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor unless the collateral is in the
possession of the secured party or the debtor has signed
a security agreement which contains a description of the
collateral and the intent to grant a security interest. Evidently, intervenor ALLEN made no attempt in any transaction whatever to obtain a written security agreement
Also, he did not attempt to maintain possession of the collateral, but rather shipped it for the purpose of selling
the same to J. B. J. An alternative method of maintaining
a security interest arises under the sales chapter of the
Uniform Commercial Code. The sales would ordinarily
be subject to the secured transactions chapter requiring
the formalities immediately above mentioned, except
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under certain conditions. Section 70A-9-113 reads as follows:
"A security interest arising solely under
the chapter on Sales (chapter 2) is subject to
the provisions of this chapter except that to the
extent that and so long as the debtor does not
have or does not lawfully obtain possession of
the goods
(a) No security agreement is necessary to
make the security interest enforceable; and
(b) no filing is required to protect the
security interest; and
(c) the rights of the secured party on
default by the debtor are governed by the chapter on Sales (chapter 2)." (emphasis added)
Under the facts contained in this record the security
interest under the Sales Chapter could not arise because
the debtor, J. B. J. had lawful possession of the goods.
The exclusions to the formalities cannot apply in such
event, thus rendering it necessary for intervenor ALLEN
to have a security agreement and to perfect the same by
filing a financing statement in order to preserve his security interest.
Construction and application of § 70A-9-113 is further
confirmed by reference to the Sales Chapter. The unpaid
seller's remedies include the right to reclaim goods upon
demand made within ten days after the buyer receives
the goods while insolvent (§ 70A-2-702), the right to withDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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hold delivery of the goods (§ 70A-2-703), and the right
to stop delivery while in transit (§ 70A-2-705). Since the
evidence, or lack of evidence, if the Court pleases, demonstrates that intervener ALLEN failed to comply with any
of the formalities necessary for reservation of the seller's
security interest, title to the cattle passed to J. B. J. for
the purchases in dispute when the animals were segregated
by DON ALLEN or his agents and identified to the contract for shipment to J. B. J. or at the very latest, when
the cattle were delivered, unloaded and received by agents
of J. B. J. (See references above to MR. ALLEN's testimony confirming that the market clearance certificates
represented bills of sale).

II. USE OF THE "V5" BRAND CREATES ONLY
A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF OWNERSHIP.
Throughout the trial and argument in the lower court,
intervenor and respondent consistently relied on presence
of the "V5" brand on certain animals as evidence of ownership. The question comes into sharp focus with reference
to the 74 head of cattle comprising the December 15 and
December 20 loads discussed above, all of which animals
were branded "V5" shortly after arrival, but before anyone other than J. B. J. claimed ownership of the animals.
Based both on the law and the facts, appellant submits
that use of the "V5" brand created, at best a rebuttable
presumption of ownership.
Section 4-13-11 reads as follows:
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"The certified copy of recordation thus
secured in the foregoing section shall be prima
facie evidence of the ownership of such animals or animals by the party whose brand and
mark it might be and shall be taken as evidence
of ownership in all courts of law or equity or
in any criminal proceedings when the title to
the animals is involved or property to be
proved."
The key tegal concept is the term "prima facie." In Black's
Law Dictionary prima facie is defined:
At first sight; on the first appearance; on the
face of it; so far as can be judged from the
first disclosure; presumably; a fact presumed
to be true unless disproved by some evidence
to the contrary.
Prima facie evidence is defined:
Evidence good and sufficient on its face; such
evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is
sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group
or chain of facts constituting the party's claim
or defense, and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.
The record is repleat with facts which serve to rebut
any presumpition of ownership of cattle branded "V5".
One of intervenor's principal witnesses on the question of
branding and ownership was a Utah State Brand Inspector, Myles Roach. Brief reference may be made to Exhibit 5, constituting Mr. Roach's brand certificate book,
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and certificates numbered 11157, 11182, 11184 and 11186
contained therein. Each of those certificates showed
MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY as owner of the
cattle inspected. Most of the animals on those certificates were branded "V5", but at least three animals had
either no brand or unknown brands. Mr. Roach was
very candid in stating that he merely identified the last
brand as the evidence of ownership when more than one
brand existed and also admitted lack of actual knowledge
regarding origin of the animals before inspection (Tr.
80 and 81). With respect to the no brand animal, Mr.
Roach didn't know the ownership, but relied on BOSWELL'S request for inspection as evidence of MOUNT
NEBO ownership (Tr. 84 1. 6). Mr. Roach made no
inspection for other brands, had no knowledge of the
origin of the animals and used MOUNT NEBO as owner
merely on the basis of the "V5" brand (Tr. 87 1. 5). The
same kind of testimony applied to Exhibit 6, particularly
cedificate 11212 therein, Exhibit 7, certificates numbered
11261 and 11262, and Exhibit 8, particularly certificates
11371 and 11377 (Tr. 99-104).
A particularly interesting and telling circumstance is
shown by the testimony referring to certificate 11377 in
Exhibit 8. Although MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY is shown as owner at the top of the page, the
certificate was signed by FIRST SECURITY, through
RoyBroadbent, as owner at the time of inspection. Also
in Exhibit 8 is certificate 11399, which shows FIRST
SECURITY as owner in both places, even though the
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cattle are branded "V5'\ The name FIRST SECURITY
was ent red thereon at the request of Mr. Broadbemt and
Mr. Re "h accepted such request as evidence of ownership (Tr. 55 1. 14 and 56 1. 29). Those animals also had
foreign brands in addition to the "V5", which were not
identified and which carried no implication of ownership,
the inspector again relying solely on the statement of
the person requesting inspection as to the identity of
the owner (Tr. 102 1. 5 and 108 1. 10).
With request to Certificate 11378 in Exhibit 8, no
"V5" brands were registered at all, but MOUNT NEBO
CATTLE COMPANY was shown as owner as a result of
the Certificates from Montana (Tr. 134 1. 7). The question becomes more intriguing with reference to Exhibit
13, Certificate 24342, Exhibit 14, Certificate 24380, Exhibit 15, Certificate 24387, Exhibit 16, Certificate 24388
and Exhibit 17, Certificate 11017. As to all of those exhibits, J. B. J. was shown as owner, in reliance on the
statements of the persons requesting inspection (Tr. 143148).
Even the State Brand Inspector was willing to rely
on extraneous statements rather than on the brands as
evidence of ownership. Although such extraneous statements themselves do not prove ownership, certainly it
becomes painfully obvious that the existence of the brands
are not evidence of ownership under these circumstances.
Without unduly repeating previous references, we
again cite the ciroimstiances concerning MR. BOSWELL's
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use of the "V5" brand on the December 15 and December
20 loads even before anyone made claim to the "V5"
brand and before there was any determination regarding
whether the cattle should be claimed by J. B. J. (in view
of the refinancing with Producer's Livestock MR. BOSWELL was seeking) or would subsequently be claimed
in a turn around of position by BOSWELL and MR.
ALLEN to be cattle of the subsequently formed MOUNT
NEBO CATTLE COMPANY.
The Court has the most graphic presentation of all
by viewing the photographs constituting Exhibits 19, 20,
21 and 85, which show animals branded both "V5" and
"(-)". Of all the evidence in the record, these photos
show without question the indiscriminate use of the "V5"
brand, even on animals which clearly and unquestionably belonged to J. B. J. MR. BOSWELL claimed that
the placing of the "V5" brand on those animals was inadvertent and an accident, and that MOUNT NEBO
made no claim for said animals (Tr. 388 1. 30).
Further rebutting any presumption of ownership by
reason of use of the "V5" brand is the testimony of Mr.
Wallace Gardner, Senior Vice President of ZIONS FIRST
NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-respondent in this action.
It was at his instance that the action was commenced,
and his bank obviously had a stake in the controversy
by reason of $50,000.00 on loan to intervener. The Court
must keep in mind that MR. BOSWELL began using
the "V5" brand on the December 15 load of animals
approximately December 16, and it was not until the
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meeting between BOSWELL, ALLEN and Gardner on
New Year's Day, January 1, 1973, that plans were made
for organizing MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY
and financing that business through a loan at ZIONS.
Thus, the original of the security agreement held by
ZIONS, Exhibit 3, had no list of cattle attached as the
language contemplated and no list was ever attached
because they were to make the list as the invoices came
in and the transactions in purchasing cattle were effected
(Tr. 571 1. 19). The only record Mr. Gardner expected
of the cattle covered by the security agreement would
be the invoices which subsequently came in (Tr. 572 1.
1). Mr. Gardner began receiving invoices during the
third week of January, reflecting cattle purchased for
MOUNT NEBO (Tr. 573 1. 6). The cattle belonging
to MOUNT NEBO were not actually in existence on
January 1, for they were to be purchased with the loan
advances and MR. ALLEN's investment (Tr. 574 1. 12).
Appellant urges strongly the conclusions which must
be drawn from certain additional testimony. Having in
mind that at least 74 head of cattle existed at the J. B. J.
yards in Goshen, Utah to which intervenor and MOUNT
NEBO CATTLE COMPANY subsequently made claim,
we view with great interest the testimony of Mr. Gardner
that no inspection of cattle was made by the bank in
January, 1973 of any animals claimed by MOUNT NEBO,
even when invoices began to arrive. We strongly urge
that if intervenor on January 1, 1973 made claim to the
74 head which had previously been branded "V5", this
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fact would have been made known to Mr .Gardner, Mr.
Gardner would have wanted to see the cattle or at least
would have admitted that such cattle existed under
MOUNT NEBO. To the contrary, however, he neither
made an inspection nor was he even made aware that
MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY claimed any cattle whatever existing in the State of Utah at that time.
These facts strongly militate against any claim by intervenor or plaintiff in this action that the 74 head comprising the December 15 and December 20 loads were to
belong to MOUNT NEBO.
We further assert that ZIONS BANK had knowledge
of the disputes between FIRST SECURITY and J. B. J.,
and that Mr. Gardner knew of MR. BOSWELL's affiliation with J. B. J. If ZIONS had intended to make any
claim whatever to any cattle then existing in the J. B. J.
yards at Goshen, the mos't natural reaction for a Senior
Vice President of the bank with 35 years experience
would have been to check out whether cattle so claimed
were involved in the controversy between FIRST SECURITY and J. B. J. Mr. Gardner knew that FIRST
SECURITY had taken some action against BOSWELL
prior to January 1, 1973 (Tr. 575 1. 24). Mr. Gardner
knew that the MOUNT NEBO cattle, when purchased,
would be headquartered at Goshen (Tr. 577 1. 1). On
or about December 13, 1972, Mr. Gardner's office had
received a letter from FIRST SECURITY (Exh. 45)
cautioning ZIONS not to pay any further checks on the
J. B. J. account, and it was common knowledge that
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J. B. J. and FIRST SECURITY were having difficulties
(Tr. 6211. 22). With all of that knowledge by Mr. Gardner, his actions were totally and diametrically opposed
to any idea that either ZIONS or MOUNT NEBO would
make claim of animals existing at that time in the J. B. J.
yards at Goshen, and particularly the 74 head comprising
the December 15 and December 20 loads. Notwithstanding the "V5" brand on those cattle ,the Court must conclude that such cattle were not and are not the property
of intervenor, and not subject to the lien of respondent.
III. THE SECURITY AGREEMENT HELD
BY ZIONS WAS EITHER INVALID
OR DID NOT ATTACH TO THE ANIMALS IN QUESTION OR BOTH.
Earlier comments in this brief have made it clear
that the legal issue between ZIONS and FIRST SECURITY does not involve conflicting priorities in the
same collateral by reason of the same debtor's having
granted two security interests. Either the cattle in dispute were those of J. B. J. subject to FIRST SECURITY'S lien or they were cattle of intervenor subject to
ZIONS' lien. Nevertheless, appellant argues that the position of ZIONS is substantially weakened with regard
to a claim to any cattle, no matter what the other facts
may be, by reason of serious defects in its documentation.
The original promissory note held by ZIONS, shown
as part of Exhibit 3, has only a minor defect in that the
date of January 2 was changed by some unknown person
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to January 3 (Tr. 566 1. 30). The security agreement,
itself, constituting the balance of Exhibit 3, was executed
before any livestock description was filled in because
the cattle had not been purchased (Tr. 568 1. 23 and 570
1. 11). The livestock description on the financing statement was filled in later along with the security agreement
(Tr. 571 1. 10). The original of the security agreement
had no list of cattle attached and no list was ever attached because the invoices representing purchases were
to come in as the transactions were thereafter made (Tr.
571 1. 19), and the only record the bank had would be
the invoices which subsequently came, which constitute
the list called for in the security agreement (Tr. 572 1.
i).
The typewritten portion of Paragraph 1 (a) of the security agreement shown as Exhibit 3 contains as the
second sentence: "All livestock now owned or to be acquired in the life of our contract." Yet, neither Mr. Gardner (Tr. 572 1. 21) nor MR. ALLEN (Tr. 512 1. 25) had
any understanding whatever of the life of the contract
or the meaning thereof. Also, Mr. Gardner admitted
that the cattle to be covered by the security agreement
were not in existence on January 1, but were to be purchased with the loan together with the investment of
MOUNT NEBO (Tr. 574 1. 12). Such facts render
completely meaningless the "now owned" language typed
into the security agreement. Since the collateral described in ZIONS security agreement was to be 200
head as per list attached, and no list was ever attached,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

49
except by incorporation through reference the invoices
for cattle purchased and received three weeks later, the
security agreement as of January 1, 1973 attached to
nothing.
The financing statement subsequently filed on January 29, 1973, after invoices started coming in for cattle
claimed by MOUNT NEBO, has further serious documentary and legal defects. Section 70A-9-402 reads in
part as follows:
(1) "A financing statment is sufficient if it
is signed by the debtor and the secured party,
gives an address of the secured party from
which information concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address
of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral." . . .
(3) A form substantially as follows is sufficient to
comply with subsection (1):
Name of debtor (or assignor)
Address
*

*

* " (emphasis supplied)

It is clear that a financing statement requires the name
of the debtor and the signature of the debtor. The Court
will readily observe from a comparison of the pink financing statement copy, part of Exhibit 1 with the certified
copy shown as Exhibit 2, that MOUNT NEBO CATTLE
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COMPANY was named as debtor, but that the signatures were those of DON ALLEN and LaDEAN S.
ALLEN, individually, without reference to the identity
of MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMANY. Designation
of an assumed business name or the name of a proprietorship, without also designating the names of the individual proprietors as debtors ,renders the financing statement invalid and fails to comply with the provisions of
§70A-9-402(l). The policy of the law on this point is
rather obvious. Corporations and partnerships are legal
entities made the subject of public records in the event
any persons desiring to inquire wish to know of the principal officers or partners. Proprietorships, however, constitute only an assumed trade name adopted by one or
more individuals for a business which must otherwise be
accounted for entirely on the personal level. A financing
statement on file showing MOUNT NEBO CATTLE
COMPANY as debtor provides persons who wish to inquire with absolutely no information whatever regarding
the nature of the entity . The Secretary of State indexes
the financing statements under the name of the debtor
shown in box number 1 on the financing statement. The
presence of individual signatures at the bottom of the
page only compounds the error rather than assisting it.
Any potential creditors of DON ALLEN, for example,
would have no way of determining whether or not his
cattle in the State of Utah were subject to a security
interest because the filed financing statement did not
show. In an effort to correct that substantial deficiency,
an additional financing statement was filed by ZIONS
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some time later (Tr. 566 1. 6). At the critical time for
this lawsuit, however, ZIONS had a defective financing
statement.
A rather persuasive precedent supporting the legal
conclusion which appellant here urges on the facts recited above, is in the matter of Matthew R. Leiehter, Individually and d/b under the trade name and style of
Landman Dry Cleaners, Bankrupt (C. C. A. 2d Cir. 1972,
471 F. 2d 785). There it was held that a financing statement showing the name of a proprietorship and a designation of "d/b/a" or the like was defective and invalid
under the Commercial Code.
Based on the foregoing, appellant asserts that respondent ZIONS had no duly perfected security interest in
any cattle ,whether MOUNT NEBO or otherwise, and
particularly it had no security interest of sufficient validity to permit it to make a claim against appellant for
conversion of cattle as alleged in the complaint.
IV. INTERVENOR AND RESPONDENT
FAILED TO SUSTAIN THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF WITH REGARD TO
TITLE TO THE ANIMALS.
In order to demonstrate the failure of intervenor
and respondent to sustain the burden of proof regarding
title to the animals, it is necessary to review certain additional evidence (or lack thereof) for the benefit of the
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solute lack of evidence in the record regarding shipments
of cattle from Montana by DON ALLEN for the benefit
of MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY. Other than
the claims to the much-disputed December 15 and December 20 loads, discussed at length earlier, and a few exceptional individual animals to which reference has been
or will be made, the record contains no testimony and
no documentary exhibits by which intervenor can show
when, by whom and to whom animals were shipped for
the benefit of MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY.
Intervenor cannot trace any of such animals into the
so-called "attached animals" which are the very substance of this lawsuit. The most fatal defect in the case
of intervenor and respondent, therefore, consists not in
an analysis of existing evidence, but rather the total lack
of supporting evidence.
Commenting briefly on the few feeble attempts to
tie in MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY animals
with the exact animals in dispute, we proceed first to
the testimony of MR. BOSWELL. Appellant candidly
asserts that many many factors in the evidence tend
to discredit the testimony of MR. BOSWELL. MR.
BOSWELL testified that he had at no time any ownership interest in MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY
and did not invest money therein (Tr. 301 1. 4), yet MR.
BOSWELL had previously testified under oath in an
affidavit filed in a separate case, but introduced in this
matter as Exhibit 26, that he was engaged in the business
of buying and selling livestock and was doing business
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in the name of MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY
(Paragraph 4, Exh. 26). He had no herds of his own for
buying, selling or feeding (Tr. 330 1. 14). Notwithstanding a brief reference to title to the MOUNT NEBO cattle in DON ALLEN of Fairfield, Montana, the rest of
the affidavit in Exhibit 26 contains no reference to MR.
BOSWELL's supposed agency for DON ALLEN and
all of the representations in that affidavit speak of MR.
BOSWELL's business and a purported interference with
his contractual relations with other persons or firms.
These matters are typical of the inconsistencies in MR.
BOSWELL's testimony.
At the trial, MR. BOSWELL testified on a number
of occasions that certain animals represented on the
various brand inspection certificates introduced by Mr.
Roach were cattle which belonged to MOUNT NEBO
CATTLE COMPANY (See, generally, Tr. 304 through
328, and, specifically, for example, Tr. 318 1. 5). Yet,
MR. BOSWELL later admitted that during 1973 he sold
approximately 5,000 head of cattle for MOUNT NEBO
and purchased about 200 head (Tr. 331 1. 19), and it was
obvious that he was primarily responsible for purchasing
and selling approximately 3,200 head of cattle for J. B. J.
during 1972 (Exh. 74). Most of said cattle were purchased from Montana sources. Of the 5,000 MOUNT
NEBO cattle, he had no idea of the identity of bulls,
heifers, steers or cows, or the origin or sellers of the
cattle (Tr. 339 1. 13, 340 1. 23). MR. BOSWELL had
no knowledge of how many of the cattle were transferred
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from one of DON ALLEN's other livestock companies.
He recognized a few Montana brands, buit paid no attention to the others (Tr. 341 1. 29 and 342 1. 5). MR.
BOSWELL had no knowledge of the date and details
of shipment and could not identify the animals in dispute with any particular shipment or invoice coming
from Montana or any particular purchase date with reference to the animals on Certificate 11157 (Tr. 344 1.
20), Certificate 11186 (Tr. 357 1. 3), Certificate 11212
(Tr. 357 1. 11), Certificate 11261 (Tr. 358 1. 28), Certificate 11262 (Tr. 361 1. 14), Certificate 11371 (Tr. 364
1. 1), Certificate 11399 (Tr. 364 1. 26), Certificate 11377
(Tr. 365 1. 29) and Exhibit 10 (Tr. 367 1. 9). MR. BOSWELL also stated that he could not clearly segregate
any animals shipped in January, 1973, from those animals
in the two loads of December 15 and December 20, 1972
(Tr. 358 1. 28).
MR. BOSWELL had agreed with the FORDS to
purchase the interests of the FORDS in J. B. J. FEEDYARDS, INC., and claimed after December 27, that the
J. B. J. FEED YARDS properties in Goshen were under
his personal control (Tr. 380 1. 23). Yet, he admitted
that no payment was ever made by him on the purported December 20 agreement for purchase of the
FORDS' interests (Tr. 379 1. 22). MR. BOSWELL was
not only a 50% stockholder of J. B. J., but was a vice
president and director (Tr. 300 1. 2), and even when
MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY was organized,
he continued to be an officer and employee thereof (Tr.
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334 1. 23) and never did cease being an agent for J. B. J.
(Tr. 460 1. 4). MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY
did not have possession of the J. B. J. FEEDYARDS
(Tr. 433 1. 28), even during the disputed December 15
and December 20 shipments.
MR. BOSWELL testified that he supervised and
participated in an inventory of animals at the J. B. J.
properties in Goshen on December 27, 1972, for the purpose of establishing values as the foundation for his
consummation of the purchase of the FORDS' interests
in J. B. J. Many other individuals also participated in
that inventory, which counted only the J. B. J. and
separated out cattle belonging to others. MR. BOSWELL
estimated that 1,200 head of cattle were present on that
inventory date, of which approximately 400 bead belonged to Mike Hatch (Tr. 351 1. 27). Thai left approximately 800 head of J. B. J. cattle, which was consistent
with what should have been there based on the other
records of J. B. J. and FIRST SECURITY. MR. BOSWELL subsequently attempted to change his testimony,
after a Court recess and consultation with counsel, for
later he said only 400 or 500 animals belonging to J. B. J.
were present on December 27 (Tr. 378 1. 1). Apparently,
the witness was reminded that his earlier response would
be damaging to the case of intervener, and thus his estimates in the later testimony reduced the number of
J. B. J. cattle by approximately the number of cattle
in dispute. This is a rather clear effort on the part of
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tervenor and respondent, and we assert that his earlier
candid response which would result in 800 J. B. J. animals of December 27, 1972 is most reliable, particularly
since it is confirmed by the other testimony and records.
MR. BOSWELL had earlier attempted to rehabilitate the portion of MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY by using MOUNT NEBO invoices to reflect sales
of the cattle from the Lazy S Cattle Company yards
which had been the subject of the sheriff's attachment.
He admitted that he used the MOUNT NEBO form,
even with the understanding that cattle were being sold
pursuant to the stipulation and agreement which appears
as Exhibit 93 (Tr. 416 1.1). The invoice numbers in
Exhibit 11 were originally described as MOUNT NEBO
invoices, but the designation was changed to reflect sales
from Lazy S prior to appellant's agreement to have that
exhibit introduced in evidence as a summary of sales of
the disputed animals (See, generally, MR. BOSWELL's
testimony with regard to the invoices, Tr. 416 through
423, and, particularly, his admission that the MOUNT
NEBO form was for his own records, even for sales handled by or for other people, Tr. 421 1. 2 and 423 1. 27).
MR. ALLEN also attempted to designate through
very general testimony that the animals which he inspected at the Lazy S Cattle Company yards on February 9, 1973 were animals which he had purchased in
Montana, thus attempting to identify them as MOUNT
NEBO animals (Tr. 493 1. 5 and 494 1. 27). Yet, he
admitted that he sold 20,000 or 25,000 cattle during the
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year 1972 and could not tell whether any brands which
he recognized on specific cattle pertained to cattle shipped
from Montana prior to January 1, 1973 (Tr. 509 1. 11
and 510 1. 19). With reference to each of the animals
which he recognized as being purchased from a neighbor,
a friend or otherwise an identifiable source, he could not
tell whether such animals were part of the shipments
prior to January 1, 1973, thus making them J, B. J. animals very clearly, or were shipped subsequent to that
time either as J. B. J. or as MOUNT NEBO cattle (Tr,
520 1. 2 and 521 1. 22). Since MR. ALLEN was not
present during any of the branding of animals in Utah,
he could not recognize a MOUNT NEBO animal, other
than the feet that the "V5" brand had been placed on
some animals (Tr. 522 1. 21).
It is evident that any attempt to identify specific
animals through memory, with a failure to present documentary evidence regarding animals shipped for the
claimed ownership of MOUNT NEBO, renders a l of the
testimony on behalf of intervenor and respondent totally
unreliable with regard to ownership. MR. ALLEN and
his counsel had ample opportunity to present the records documenting sales from any Montana source to
MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY, but utterly
failed to provide any meaningful records for the benefit
of the Court. The oral testimony regarding ownership
was so unreliable, as evidenced by the examples of testimony discussed above, that this Court has no reasonable
alternative, but to declare unsupported by the evidence
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the findings of the lower Court regarding ownership by
intervener and to reverse the lower Court's judgment.
In further support of that argument, appellant made
a record in the lower Court which demonstrates rather
convincingly that the reason for intervener's failure to
provide documentary evidence in support of his alleged
chain of title is the fact that the documentary evidence
would not support his claim. After some discussion between Court, counsel and appellant's witness, Mr. Broadbent, Exhibit 86 was received into evidence (Tr. 864 1.
5). That exhibit represents all of the records which
appellant was able to obtain from intervenor and respondent relating to shipments by MOUNT NEBO CATTLE
COMPANY of cattle into Utah from the period January
1, 1973 through February 7, 1973, the date prior to physical possession by the sheriff and subsequent taking of
cattle in dispute to the Lazy S Cattle Company yards.
The proposition is that if the attached cattle here in
dispute, were, in fact, cattle belonging to MOUNT NEBO,
then through use of MOUNT NEBO's invoices for the
period prior to the attachment, we should be able to
trace the Montana brands and determine whether those
brands appeared on the attached cattle. If not, the cattle did not belong to MOUNT NEBO. Appellant made
a painstaking search, comparison and analysis of the
brands on cattle which were clearly those of MOUNT
NEBO described in Exhibit 86, compared with the socalled "foreign" or "Montana" brands on all of the brand
inspections pertaining to the cattle in dispute, most of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

59
which are summarized on Exhibit 11. Out of the 267
head taken pursuant to the attachment, only 12 possible
duplications of brands exist. This means that at the
very least, 255 of the attached animals in dispute were
clearly not those of MOUNT NEBO. It is the assertion
of appellant that even the 12 animals bearing similar
brands cannot unequivocally be identified as MOUNT
NEBO. DON ALLEN may have purchased animals
with a certain brand for shipment to J. B. J. in 1972 and
purchased additional animals with the same brand or
brands for shipment to MOUNT NEBO in 1973. Because
of all of the circumstances asserted in this brief on behalf
of appellant, such animals would be declared under the
ownership of J. B. J. subject to appellant's lien.
To aid the Court in its analysis, we will briefly describe the 12 animals shown on Exhibit 86, which have
brands in common with those shown on Exhibit 11 or
other exhibits supporting Exhibit 11 and describing the
animals in dispute sold from the Lazy S yards.
(1) Exhibit 87 is Fred Diamond's inspection certificate of April 16,1973 for some of the cattle in the Lazy
S property. One animal carried a brand which is a Bar
Lazy SZ which is similar to a brand also shown on market
clearance certificate 467504, part of Exhibit 86.
(2) On Exhibit 10, a Myles Roach inspection certificate, occurs one animal with a A/B, similar to a brand
shown on Montana market clearance 469366, part of Exhibit 86.
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(3) Exhibit 89 is the brand inspection certificate
of Mr. R. C. Sessions pertaining to cattle sold out of the
Lazy S yards on April 11, 1973, with specific reference to
Mr. Sessions' Certificate 1647. Ten animals there reflected bear brands similar to brands on MOUNT NEBO
invoices made part of Exhibit 86. One animal shows a
K4 which is similar to a brand shown on Montana livestock certificate 410726, Exh. 86.
(4) (5) (6) Three animals on Mr. Sessions' certificate bear an A with what appears to be an s to the
lower right, a brand similar to a brand shown on Certificate 426042 on Exhibit 86.
(7) There is a J with a little figure on the right on
Mr. Sessions' certificate which appears to correspond with
one animal of similar brand on Montana certificate
373082, Exhibit 86.
(8) One animal with an R and a plus sign and
what appears to be a 3 in Mr. Sessions' certificate appears similar to a brand on Montana certificate 464336,
a part of Exhibit 86.
(9) (10) Two animals bearing an S with a curved
bar underneath are similar to a brand on Montana certificate 469305, Exhibit 86.
(11) A brand appearing to be EP is similar to a
brand on Montana certificate 464336, Exhibit 86.
(12) Finally, one animal with an LL with a curved
bar underneath appears in Mr. Sessions' certificate similar to a brand in Montana certificate 41076, Exhibit 86.
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With respect to all other animals under the attachment and in dispute in this case, no Montana brands
appear on those animals which duplicate any brands on
animals originating in Montana and purchased by DON
ALLEN for MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY as
reflected in Exhibit 86.
CONCLUSION
1. J. B. J. and FIRST SECURITY have demonstrated that all of the cattle in question, enumerated in
Findings 15,16,18,19, 20, 21 and 22, are caittle purchased
by J. B. J. and made subject to the lien of FIRST SECURITY;
2. Iiutervenor and Respondent have failed to sustain
any burden of proof whatever with regard to title to the
animals;
3. This Court is both empowered and required to reverse tihe Findings, Conclusions and Judgment of the Trial
Judge, who sat without a jury, and should require the
entry of new Findings, Conclusions and Judgment awarding the disputed cattle and proceeds thereof to J. B, J.,
subject to the security interest of FIRST SECURITY;
4. This Court should further order that the proceeds
held by the Clerk of the lower Court and obtained by Intervenor and Respondent in the amount of $34,127.18 must
be returned to FIRST SECURITY and that FIRST SECURITY may also apply to the outstanding indebtedness
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of J. B. J. the additional funds it holds representing proceeds of the disputed cattle;
5. Oos/ts should be awarded to Appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
DON B. ALLEN of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
V. PERSHING NELSON of
ALDRICH & NELSON
43 East 200 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for
Defendant-Appellant
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